The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 6, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. 2. By this stipulation, the United States now moves to continue the status conference until May 20, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between May 6, 2013 and May 20, 2013. Defendant does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for the government will be unavailable for the hearing on May 6, 2013, because he needs to be out of the office for a medical appointment for a family member in Los Angeles.
b) The parties are currently in negotiation over a potential plea. The parties need more time to negotiate the terms of this potential plea.
c) This time period is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (7)(B)(iv) because the unavailability of government counsel would unreasonably deny the government continuity of counsel.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 6, 2013 to May 20, 2013 , inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at plaintiff's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: May 2, 2013 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ MARK J. McKEON MARK J. MCKEON Assistant United States Attorney Dated: May 2, 2013 /s/ JANET BATEMAN JANET BATEMAN Counsel for Defendant