May 2, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
SIMEON SHAWNISE GREGORY, SARAH ELIZABETH TROUT THERESA HELENA CAMPBELL TERRANCE RYCHAN SMALLS, Defendants.
DAVID D. FISCHER (SBN 224900), LAW OFFICES OF DAVID D. FISCHER, APC, Attorney for Defendant, SARAH E. TROUT. Sacramento, CA.
DAVID D. Fischer for, JEFFREY L. STANIELS, Attorney for Defendant, SIMEON SHAWNISE GREGORY.
DAVID D. FISCHER, Attorney for Defendant, SARAH ELIZABETH TROUT.
OLAF HEDBERG, Attorney for Defendant, THERESA HELENA CAMPBELL.
DAVID D. Fischer for, JARED C. DOLAN, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff.
STEVEN B. PLESSER, Attorney for Defendant, TERRANCE RYCHAN SMALLS.
BENJAMIN WAGNER, U.S. ATTORNEY,
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 3, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 28, 2013, and to exclude time between May 3, 2013, and June 28, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 3, 566 pages of investigative reports and related documents. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b. Counsel for the defendants desires additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 3, 2013, to June 28, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.