THOMAS A. JOHNSON, #119203, Sacramento, California, Attorney for Andrey Kim.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, LEE BICKLEY, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and Defendant, Andrey Kim, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 9, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, Defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference to August 1, 2013, and to exclude time between May 9, 2013, and August 1, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 1, 800 pages of discovery. This discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time in order to continue review of the discovery and to conduct research related to the charges. Counsel also notes that the defendant is also charged in United States v. Chartaev, Cr. No. S-11-514 GEB, a much larger case involving 11 defendants and approximately 4, 500 pages of discovery. Any resolution of the current case must necessarily depend on a thorough understanding of that case. Consequently, the defense requires additional time to review the discovery and consider its options in that case.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 9, 2013, to August 1, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...