The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gary S. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE IN THIRTY DAYS
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), brings this civil rights action against Defendant Matthew Juarez, a correctional sergeant employed by the CDCR at KVSP. The events that give rise to his lawsuit occurred at KVSP. Plaintiff claims that Defendant subjected him to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also refers to "discrimination of preferential treatment." The Court will construe this as an equal protection claim.
Plaintiff alleges that while on the yard, he was involved in a fight with another inmate. Officers ordered both inmates to get on the ground. Plaintiff complied with the orders. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "kicked my with his boot with force on my left shoulder. Then he put his knee on my back and pulled my right arm behind me and twisted it higher extending it with malicious force." (Compl. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff also alleges that Juarez used "profane names and hostile statements." Plaintiff was taken to the Program Office, where he was placed in a holding cell. Plaintiff stated that he "was in extreme pain to my right shoulder." The next morning, Plaintiff received medical treatment and x-rays.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement." Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). '[W]hile conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they 'must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.'" Id. (Quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). "What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends on the claim at issue . . . ." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
For excessive force claims, the issue is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident." Id. at 9-10.
Here, Plaintiff's allegations fail to satisfy the constitutional standard. The allegations indicate that Defendant was responding to an incident of mutual combat. Plaintiff alleges that Juarez used his foot to kick Plaintiff on the left shoulder, then placed Plaintiff in mechanical restraints. Although Plaintiff alleges that Juarez used force "maliciously," the force used was to place Plaintiff in mechanical restraints respond to inmate on inmate violence. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support his conclusory allegation that the force used was malicious. There are no allegations regarding the extent of injury, or what injuries, if any, Plaintiff's examination revealed.
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations to be vague. The allegations support, at most, a de minimis use of force. Plaintiff sets forth a generalized allegation that the use of force was malicious, but fails to alleges specific facts to support that conclusion. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). "A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person 'does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "[T]he 'requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.'" Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44).
Plaintiff need not, however, set forth legal arguments in support of his claims. In order to hold an individual defendant liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where that defendant is employed and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under color of state ...