May 9, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
BALTAZAR RODRIGUEZ, et al. Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, KAREN A. ESCOBAR, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for the filing of the government's response to pretrial motions on or before Friday, May 17, 2013, and a hearing on the motions on June 3, 2013, at 8:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties agree to continue the filing of the government's response to May 30, 2013, to hear the motions on June 3, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the government desires additional time to respond to the defendants' motions, in light of deadlines related to the filing of the government's appeal brief in United Sates v. Xi Andy Lieng following his jury trial and conviction in this Court, as well as the need of the defense to conduct further investigation and inspect the evidence, which is located in Kernville, California.
b. Counsel for the parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 3, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv), because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.