UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 15, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
CHRISTOPHER LEE BARNA,
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ) FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. Defendant first appeared before Magistrate Judge Newman, a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending, on November 28, 2012. On that date, this matter was set for status on January 14, 2013 before Judge Shubb. In addition, at the request of defendant, for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from November 28, 2012, through January 14, 2013, was deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B (iv) [Local Code T4]. By previous stipulations and orders approved by Judge Shubb and this Court, the status conference was continued until May 16, 2013 and time was excluded under Local Code T4.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 30, 2013 and to exclude time between May 16, 2013 and May 30, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the court find the following:
a. The government has represented that there is substantial discovery associated with the case which includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form (approximately 880 pages). All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel. In addition, the government recently conveyed a revised plea offer to the defense.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation related to the charges, to review discovery for this matter, to review the plea offer, and to otherwise prepare for potential resolution of this matter or trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Counsel for defendant has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his client and represents that his client concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
f. Defendant Barna has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his counsel and represents that he concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 16, 2013 to May 30, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the judge at defendant's request on the basis of the judge's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: 15 May 2013. /s/ Tice-Raskin S. ROBERT TICE-RASKIN Assistant United States Attorney DATED: 15 May 2013. /s/ Doug Beevers DOUGLAS BEEVERS Counsel for Defendant
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