The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable John A. Mendez
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS
UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Date: June 25, 2013 Time: 9:45 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on May 21, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 25, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between May 21, 2013 and June 25, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 12,000 pages of discovery.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of May 21, 2013 to June 25, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.