IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 17, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
LAMON KELLEY, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
TONI H. CARBONE (SBN 210119) ATTORNEY AT LAW 11930 Heritage Oak Place, Suite 6 Auburn, CA 95603 Telephone: (530) 885-6244 Facsimile: (530) 885-8245 Attorney for Defendant LAMON KELLEY
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF ADMIT/DENY HEARING; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Defendant, LAMON KELLEY, by and through his counsel of record, TONI CARBONE, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for an Admit/Deny hearing on May 17, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the Admit/Deny hearing until May 31, 2013, and to exclude time between May 17, 2013 and May 31, 2013 under Local Code T4. The GOVERNMENT does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The GOVERNMENT and the defendant through defense counsel TONI CARBONE have conferred and determined that a piece of evidence that we have yet to receive may change the allegations in the Petition and/or potential resolution. We are in communication with the Probation Officer regarding this issue. Resolution of this issue will aid defendant in determining whether to Admit or Deny in an Admit/Deny hearing. As such, it may be most efficient to resolve this issue prior to having an Admit/Deny hearing.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The GOVERNMENT does not object to the continuance.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 17, 2013 to May 31, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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