May 20, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
JAIME RIVERA DIAZ, aka Jaime Diaz Rivra, aka Jaime Dias Rivera, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, NIRAV K. DESAI, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
H. Ernesto Castillo, Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 16, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 13, 2013 and to exclude time between May 16, 2013, and June 13, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 113 pages of documents contained on a CD. All of this discovery was produced directly to defendant's prior counsel, and was transferred to defendant's retained counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and review the discovery and the Pre-Plea Advisory Guideline Presentence Investigation Report for this matter in advance of an anticipated change of plea and request for judgment and sentencing. Additionally, counsel for defendant is presently in trial through June 6, 2013, with trials days of Monday through Thursday.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny his client continuity of counsel.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 16, 2013, to June 13, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
In accordance with the foregoing stipulation, and good cause appearing, IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED. The status conference in this matter is hereby continued from May 16, 2013 to June 13, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 7.