May 22, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
VALERI KALYUZHNYY, Defendant,
Clifford B. Scherer, CLIFFORD B. SCHERER LAW, Roseville, CA, Attorney for Defendant, Valeri Kalyuzhnyy.
CLIFFORD B. SCHERER, ESQ., Counsel for the Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER THEREON
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
Defendant VALERI KALYUZHNYY, by and through his counsel of record, and Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 23, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 26, 2013 and to exclude time between May 23, 2013 and September 26, 2013 under Local Code T4 and Local Code T2. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 3, 834 documents bates numbered XXXXX-XXXXXX. All of this discovery was released to the Defendant's counsel at the first appearance and arraignment hearing.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to adequately comply with the Government's request for discovery, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 23, 2013 to September 26, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
g. The time period between May 23, 2013 and September 26, 2013 is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(b)(ii) [Local Code T2] as this case is a complex mortgage fraud case involving several properties;
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
In accordance with the foregoing stipulation and good cause appearing, IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED. The status conference in this matter is continued from May 23, 2013 to September 26, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 7.