May 24, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
BARBARA ELLEN HOLLAND, Defendant.
MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612), United States Attorney, MIRANDA KANE (CABN 150630), Chief, Criminal Division, MEREDITH J. EDWARDS (CABN 279301), Special Assistant United States Attorney, CYNTHIA LIE Assistant Federal Public Defender, San Jose, California, Attorneys for the United States of America.
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER RESCHEDULING HEARING DATE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.
The United States, by and through Special Assistant United States Attorney Meredith J. Edwards, and defendant Barbara Ellen Holland, by and through Assistant Federal Public Defender Cynthia Lie, hereby stipulate that, with the Court's approval, the status hearing currently set for Tuesday, May 28, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., be vacated and rescheduled for Tuesday, June 18, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. The government requests this continuance in order to prepare a proposed disposition. Defense counsel has no objection to the rescheduling of the hearing, as the later date provides the defense with the reasonable time necessary to review the discovery that the government belatedly sent yesterday, May 22, 2013. Accordingly, the parties jointly respectfully request that the time between May 28, 2013 and June 18, 2013 be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), to provide both the government and the defense with the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation.
Pursuant to the agreement and stipulation of the parties, the Court hereby orders that the status hearing in this case, previously scheduled for Tuesday, May 28, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., be vacated and rescheduled for Tuesday, June 18, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. The Court further orders that the time between May 28, 2013 and June 18, 2013 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The Court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.