ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 22]
GONZALO P. CURIEL, District Judge.
On March 15, 2013, Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") and Ocwen Loan Servicing filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 22.) On March 27, 2013 Defendant Saxon Mortgage filed a notice joining aforementioned motion. (Dkt. No. 24.) For the reasons set out below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice.
On May 31, 2007, Plaintiffs Douglas and Julie Alsobrook completed a loan for the property located at 4075 Bancroft Drive, La Mesa, California 91941 and the promissory note was secured by a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust lists MERS as "the beneficiary under this Security Instrument, " American Home Mortgage as the lender, and Lawyer's Title as the trustee. On February 12, 2010, a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust was filed in San Diego County, which showed that Plaintiffs were in default on the aforementioned loan in the amount of $18, 309.78. (Dkt. No. 23, Ex. 2 "Notice of Default.") On March 16, 2010, MERS assigned all of its rights, title and interest in the Deed of Trust to Saxon Mortgage Services, inc. (Dkt. No. 23, Ex. 3 "Assigned of Deed of Trust.") On June 14, 2012, a notice of sale was recorded by the Trustee, setting a sale date for July 10, 2012 and indicating an unpaid obligation of $335, 426.42. (Dkt. No. 23, Ex. 6 "Notice of Sale.") The sale date has been postponed by oral proclamation. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2, "Statement of Facts.")
On August 31, 2012, Plaintiffs brought this pro se action alleging wrongful foreclosure and fraud, seeking injunction and declaratory relief to prevent the foreclosure of their property and seeking to void the Deed of Trust and to quiet title. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 12, 2013, this Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice and granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 20.) On February 26, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 21, "FAC.") The FAC alleges wrongful foreclosure and seeks to quiet title and declaratory relief. (Id.)
Plaintiffs assert American Home Mortgage improperly transferred or assigned the promissory note related to their property. (FAC ¶¶ 17-23.) Plaintiffs allege American Home Mortgage failed to properly transfer the deed of trust to the REMIC Trust resulted in a violation of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. (FAC ¶¶ 24-25.) According to Plaintiffs, American Home Mortgage failed to physically deliver the promissory note to an unnamed REMIC trust and therefore "the Deed of Trust is rendered a nullity [since] the Promissory Note itself is not also transferred." (FAC ¶ 32.) Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that because American Mortgage failed to properly transfer the promissory note and as American Mortgage is now out of business, neither REMIC Trust nor Ocwen Loan Servicing have the legal right to collect mortgage payments from Plaintiffs. (FAC ¶ 43.) Plaintiff further alleges wrongful foreclosure based on the theory that Defendants do not have standing to foreclose on the property because MERS improperly assigned the interest under the Deed of Trust. (FAC ¶¶ 50-52.) Plaintiffs also assert Defendants have failed to comply with California Civil Code §§ 2932.5 because there was no recorded assignment of deed of trust. (FAC ¶¶ 53-56.)
Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") move to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 22.) Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 22 at 2.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge securitization of their loan and lack standing to challenge the wrongful foreclosure based on the MERS assignment. (Id. at 3-5.) Defendants also contend Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to quiet title and declaratory relief. (Id. at 5-6.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block , 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson , 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give "detailed factual allegations, " a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id . In other words, "the non-conclusory factual content, ' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service , 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis , 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc. , 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. Mining Council v. Watt , 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
A. Quiet Title
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim to quiet title. Under California Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs are required to state: (a) a legal description of the real property and its street address, (b) Title as to which a determination is sought and the basis of the title, (c) adverse claims to the title, (d) the date as to which the determination is sought, and (e) a prayer for the determination of the title of the Plaintiff against the adverse claims. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §761.020. Moreover, to quiet title the debt must be discharged. Aguilar v. Bocci , 39 Cal.App.3d 475, 477 (1979)("[A]ppellant can[not] quiet title without discharging his debt... the cloud upon his title persists until the debt is paid")(internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs allege that because American Home Mortgage did not properly sell or transfer the promissory note no party can enforce the terms of the loan and Plaintiffs have no further debt obligations on the loan. (FAC ¶¶ 38, ...