BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, PAUL A. HEMESATH, MICHAEL M. BECKWITH, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Sacramento, California.
DONALD MASUDA Attorney for Defendant IRMA GONZALEZ.
OLAF HEDBERG Attorney for Defendant GERMAN GONZALEZ VELAZQUEZ.
DINA SANTOS Attorney for Defendant MAURICIO PORTILLO.
GILBERT ROQUE Attorney for Defendant GUADALUPE REYES-ONTIVEROS.
CHRIS COSCA Attorney for Defendant MIGUEL CORONA-SORIA.
STIPULATION AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Michael Beckwith and Paul Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorneys, attorneys for plaintiff; Kenny Giffard and Donald Masuda, attorneys for defendant Irma Gonzalez; Olaf Hedberg, attorney for defendant German Velazquez; Dina Santos, attorney for defendant Mauricio Portillo; Gilbert Roque, attorney for defendant Guadalupe Reyes-Ontiveros; and Chris Cosca, attorney for Miguel Corona-Soria, that the previously-scheduled status conference date of June 4, 2013, be vacated and the matter set for status conference on July 30, 2013, at 9:45 a.m.
This request is made jointly by the government and defense in order to permit time for continued preparation, including investigation, which is currently in progress, and plea negotiations. The parties agree that the interests of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Further, the parties agree and stipulate the ends of justice served by the granting of such a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial and that time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act should therefore be excluded under 18 U.S.C. sections 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Codes T2 [complex case] and T4 [reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare], from June 4, 2013, to and including July 30, 2013.
The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings and trial itself within the time limits established in 18 U.S.C. section 3161. In addition, the Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel to this stipulation reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
The Court orders that the time from June 4, 2013, up to and including July 30, 2013, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sections 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), and Local Codes T2 [complex case] and T4 [reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare]. It is further ...