June 4, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
OGANES SEROBYAN, Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ROBERT M. WILSON, Counsel for Robert M. Wilson.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on June 6, 2013 at 9:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant moves to continue the status conference until August 1, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between June 6, 2013 and August 1, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including American Express records documenting tens of thousands of transactions. These documents, which contain the credit card numbers and identity information of thousands of individuals, are only available for review at the government's office only in order to protect the individuals' private information. Defense counsel has not yet had an opportunity to review all of these records due to his trial and mediation schedule. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, and/or will be made available.
b. Counsel for defendant has been reviewing these materials, discussing them with his client, and assessing potential trial and sentencing issues.
c. Defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with his client, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of defense counsel, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on August 1, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. and that it find excludable time from June 6, 2013 through and including the August 1, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to August 1, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 6, 2013 to August 1, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.