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United States v. Gomez

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

June 6, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
GERARDO ROSAS GOMEZ, Defendant.

ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 068525, NICHOLAS A. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 275568, LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, Fresno, California, Attorney for Defendant, GERARDO ROSAS GOMEZ.

Kathleen A. Servatius, Assistant United States Attorney.

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE SENTENCING

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on June 10, 2013, at 8:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until June 24, 2013, at 1:30 p.m. and to exclude time between June 10, 2013, and June 24, 2013, under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The discovery in this matter is extensive and counsel has not yet finished reviewing it and plea negotiations are continuing.
b. Counsel requests an afternoon calendar, because he will be making an appearance in Tulare County Superior Court, Visalia Division in the matter of People v. Ayala, et al. Case No. VCF 281353.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 10, 2013, to June 24, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...


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