June 6, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
DEJON DEVIN ANDRADE, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JUSTIN L. LEE, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA.
LEXI NEGIN, Assistant Federal Defender, Counsel for the defendant.
STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. At the defendant's Arraignment, this matter was set for a Status Conference on June 7, 2013.
2. By this Stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference until July 12, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between June 7, 2013, and July 12, 2013, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States provided discovery to the defendant on April 3, 2013. Defense counsel has reviewed the discovery with the defendant, however, defense counsel believes that further discussions with the defendant are necessary.
b. The United States has extended a plea offer in this matter. Defense counsel and the defendant need further time to discuss the plea offer and its consequences.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The United States does not object to this continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, within which trial must commence, the time period of June 7, 2013, to July 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.