June 24, 2013
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
VALERI MYSIN, Defendant.
JOHN R. DUREE, JR., INC. A Professional Corporation, Sacramento, California, Attorney for Defendant VALERI MYSIN.
LEE BICKLEY, Assistant U.S. Attorney, MATTHEW McCRARY SCOBLE, Attorney for Angela Shavlovsky.
DINA SANTOS, Attorney for Michael Kennedy
JOSEPH WISEMAN, Attorney for Alexander Kokhanets
CLIFFORD SCHERER, Attorney for Boris Murzak
JULIA MARY YOUNG, Attorney for Zinaida Murzak
JOHN PAUL BALAZS, Attorney for Vitaliy Tuzman
STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 25, 2013 at 9:15 am in Courtroom 7.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 27, 2013, at 9:15 a.m. am in Courtroom 7 and to exclude time between June 25, 2013 and August 27, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have commenced negotiations but have not yet reached resolutions.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 25, 2013 to August 27, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.