Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

McBride v. First California Mortgage Co.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

July 1, 2013

GREGORY S. MCBRIDE and CONCETTA MCBRIDE, Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs filed an action in Monterey Superior Court advancing claims which include violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act, and the Real Estate and Settlement Procedures Act. Defendants removed the action to federal court and defendant First California Mortgage Company moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiffs submitted a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against all defendants except First California Mortgage Company. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved for entry of default judgment with respect to defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), HSBC Bank USA, and Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-6. Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC ("Aurora") then moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The motion was granted on January 14, 2013. Defendant MERS now moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), this matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND[1]

This action arises out of the foreclosure of plaintiffs' residence at 471 Salinas Hwy in Salinas, California. Plaintiffs dispute the current deed of trust reflecting title to the property and allege defendants cannot establish possession and proper transfer of the Promissory Note or assignment of the mortgage. Plaintiffs obtained a securitization audit showing that First California Mortgage Company extended a loan to them, but shortly thereafter the promissory note was sold to Luminent Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6 and HSBC Bank USA, N.A., became its Trustee. According to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement associated with the note, the Trust purchased mortgage default insurance. Plaintiffs aver the Trustee applied for an insurance pay-out of the loan balance after plaintiffs did not make three consecutive payments. As a result, plaintiffs claim the promissory note has been paid in full. Plaintiffs go on to state MERS cannot assign any rights to the mortgage or deed of trust to a third party, and that MERS is not a true beneficiary of the loan. Thus, they claim, any transfer assignment of the mortgage is invalid under state and federal law. Finally, plaintiffs allege that, in order for the Trustee to have a valid and enforceable claim against plaintiffs' home, it must prove that there was a complete and unbroken chain of endorsements and transfers of the Note and that the Trustee has physical possession of it. On the basis of these allegations, plaintiffs seek cancellation of the mortgage instruments. Accordingly, plaintiffs bring this action for Quiet Title, Declaratory Relief, Wrongful Foreclosure, and Fraud.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Pleadings must be so construed so as to do justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e). While "detailed factual allegations are not required, " a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 652, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard asks for "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully." Id. This determination is a context-specific task requiring the court "to draw in its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or on "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences, " however, "are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a clam." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("threadbare recitals of the elements of the claim for relief, supported by mere conclusory statements, " are not taken as true).

In dismissing a complaint, leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep't of Corporations, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Quiet Title (Claim One)

Plaintiffs aver MERS has no right to title, estate, lien, or any other interest in the property and assert a quiet title claim against MERS. Plaintiffs recite the requisite elements of a quiet title claim and reassure this Court the promissory note obligations have been fulfilled, but do not bring forth any evidence showing a tender of payment in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As discussed in the September 24, 2012 Order dismissing the first complaint, a foreclosure can only be set aside with evidence establishing performance of the promissory note through tender or the ability to effect tender. See Agbabiaka v. HSBC Bank USA Nat. Assc., 2010 WL 1609974, *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010). Neither a plain assertion of such performance nor recitation of legal elements will suffice. See Id. Because plaintiffs have still not provided evidence supporting a right to title, estate, lien, or any other interest in the property, this claim must be dismissed without leave to amend.

B. Declaratory Relief (Claim Two)

As made clear in the September 24, 2012 Order, declaratory relief is an equitable remedy, not an independent claim. When the harm has already occurred, the party must seek damages rather than declaratory relief. Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irr. Dist. Employee Pension Plan, 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 (2007). "Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs." Id. Plaintiffs' FAC and Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss reflect their misunderstanding of this prior Order, as the foreclosure sale occurred more than two years ago. Any wrongdoings regarding the assignment of MERS's interest in the property, even if supported by evidence, would redress past wrongs and thus precludes plaintiffs from seeking declaratory relief. See Id. Since the last Order, plaintiffs have not averred any new facts suggesting ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.