July 2, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LIO WILLIAM MATAAFA, et al., Defendants.
Robert M. Holley (SBN 50769), Attorney at Law, Sacramento, CA, Counsel for Lio William Mataafa.
Mr.JOHN R. DUREE, JR., Counsel for Defendant, Ms. Jaclyn Susan Majstoric.
Mr. RON PETERS, Counsel for Defendant, Mr. Frankie Thomas Goulding.
STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.
REASONS FOR REQUEST
Counsel for all three defendants and counsel for the government in this matter have been actively pursuing a resolution that would avoid the necessity of a jury trial. We all need a little more time and fully expect signed plea agreements to be filed before the next court appearance, date and time set forth herein below. It is requested that the matter be continued for status conference to Tuesday, August 6, 2013 at 9:15 p.m. This request for continuance is made by stipulation and proposed order to save the Court and the lawyers the unnecessary expenditure of court time and to save the U.S. Marshal the time and expense of unnecessary inmate transportation.
It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto through their undersigned respective counsel as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference for Tuesday, July 2, 2013 at 9:15 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants, and each of them, with the acquiescence of the undersigned government counsel, now move to continue the status conference to Tuesday, August 6, 2013 at 9:15 a.m. and to exclude time from July 2, 2013 up to and including August 6, 2013 under local code T4.
3. The parties agree, stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. All parties have been actively involved in resolving these matters and avoiding the necessity of a jury trial. All parties need this additional time to resolve any and all plea and sentencing issues.
b. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case, as requested, outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
c. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 2, 2013 up to and including August 6, 2013, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.