JILL MARIE THOMAS, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff U.S.A.
LAW OFFICES OF ARTURO HERNANDEZ-M., ARTURO HERNANDEZ-M., Attorney for Defendant, DIEGO FERNANDO LIMON RODRIGUEZ.
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JILL MARIE THOMAS, A.U.S.A.; THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT; AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE. TROY L. NUNLEY, PRESIDIING IN SAID COURT:
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Jill Marie Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorney, attorney for plaintiff, and Arturo Hernandez-M., attorney for defendant Diego Fernando Limon Rodriguez, that the previously scheduled status conference date of July 11, 2013, be vacated and the matter be reset for September 19, 2013.
This request is made jointly by the government and defense in order to permit time for continued preparation, which is currently in progress to complete all facets of readiness for settlement of this case. The parties agree that the interests of justice is served by granting this continuance outweighs the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Further, the parties agree and stipulate that the ends of justice served by the granting of such a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and that time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act should therefore be excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that it is unreasonable to expect that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings and trial itself within the time limits established in 18 U.S.C. § 3161. In addition, the Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel to this stipulation reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
The Court orders that the time from July 11, 2013, up to and including August 29, 2013, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). It is further ordered that the July 11, 2013, status ...