JAN DAVID KAROWSKY, Attorney at Law, A Professional Corporation, JAN DAVID KAROWSKY Attorney for Defendant Gennadiy Yurkevich.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, Gennadiy Yurkevich by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 30, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 27, 2013 at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between July 30, 2013 and August 27, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. Additionally, defense counsel has recently provided discovery to the government, and both parties need time to review the relevant documents.
b. Based on the foregoing, counsel need additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the discovery, and defense counsel needs additional time to consult with the defendant to assess potential trial and sentencing issues and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on August 27, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. and that it find excludable time from July 30, 2013 through and including the August 27, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to August 27, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government agrees to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 30, 2013 to August 27, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...