August 9, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
VYACHESLAVA STASYUK, Defendant.
MICHAEL D. ANDERSON, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff,
TASHA PARIS CHALFANT (SBN 207055), THE LAW OFFICES OF TASHA PARIS CHALFANT, Rocklin, California, Attorney for Defendant, VYACHESLAVA STASYUK.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 15, 2013. By the court's own motion, the matter was requested to be moved to another date because of a conflict with the Court's calendar.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 24, 2013, and to exclude time between August 15, 2013, and October 24, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 381 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with her client and continue to conduct investigation such as locating and interviewing witnesses. Many of the interviews being conducted require the use of a Russian interpreter so the coordination of such involves the schedule of multiple parties (the investigator, the interpreter and the witness). Once the interviews are completed, counsel for defendant will need to discuss potential resolutions with her client.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 15, 2013 to October 24, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.