ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT AND SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, District Judge.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff Erik Rothenberg's Complaint, which advances five causes of action: two under federal laws and three under state or common laws. Upon closer inspection, the two federal causes of action are defectively pleaded. And so, it appears that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on "the lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)-a short and plain statement-to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). For a complaint to sufficiently state a claim, its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While specific facts are not necessary so long as the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests, a complaint must nevertheless "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Iqbal 's plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, " but does not go so far as to impose a "probability requirement." Id. Rule 8 demands more than a complaint that is merely consistent with a defendant's liability-labels and conclusions, or formulaic recitals of the elements of a cause of action do not suffice. Id. Instead, the complaint must allege sufficient underlying facts to provide fair notice and enable the defendant to defend itself effectively. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe "[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint... as true and... in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]." Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences need not be blindly accepted as true by the court. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Yet, a complaint should be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts" supporting plaintiff's claim for relief. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999).
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint that has been dismissed should be freely granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when "the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
A court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, so long as it affords the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981).
Rothenberg's Complaint alleges two federal causes of action: Declaratory Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 2202; and Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Both of these are insufficiently plead to properly state a claim.
A. Rothenberg's FDCPA claim fails because Frazier is not a creditor as a matter of law
The purpose of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, including the harassment and abuse of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). "To effectuate this purpose, the Act prohibits a debt collector' from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices." Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC., 589 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(d)-(f). Accordingly, "[t]o state a claim for violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a debt collector' collecting a debt." Izenberg, 589 F.Supp.2d at 1199.
A "debt collector" under the FDCPA is defined as any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added).
The FDCPA expressly excludes from this definition any person collecting or Case 2:13-cv-05729-ODW-JEM Document 6 Filed 08/12/13 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:52 attempting to collect a debt originated by that person. Id. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii). Moreover, "[t]he law is well-settled that creditors, mortgagors, and mortgage servicing companies are not debt collectors and are statutorily exempt from liability under the FDCPA." Costantini v. Wachovia Mortg. FSB, No. 2:09-cv-0406-MCE-DAD, 2009 WL 1810122, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2009) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Hepler v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. CV 07-4804 CAS (Ex), 2009 WL 1045470 at *4, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2009)). And even more broadly, "most courts to examine this issue have concluded that ...