August 16, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
LAFONSO LUKE BROWN, RASHAD RAKEEM BROWN, RAKEEM MARCELLES BROWN, and MARCELIS FITZGERALD LEE, Defendants.
MELINDA HAAG, (CABN 132612) United States Attorney.
J. DOUGLAS WILSON, (DCBN 412811) Chief, Criminal Division.
NATALIE LEE, (CABN 277362) Assistant United States Attorney, San Francisco, California. Attorneys for the United States of America
ELIZABETH FALK, Attorney for Lafonso Luke Brown.
MICHAEL HINCKLEY, Attorney for Marcelis Lee.
RANDY SUE POLLOCK, Attorney for Rashad Brown.
ISMAIL RAMSEY, Attorney for Rakeem Brown.
[PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
On July 23, 2013, the parties made a status appearance before the Court. The parties requested, and the Court ordered, a final continuance until August 20, 2013, on which date the parties anticipate a final status conference to discuss change of plea, motions, or trial. The stated purpose of the continuance request was to afford defense counsel adequate time to prepare and to review discovery which consists of both paper documents and discs containing records and also for plea negotiations to occur.
The parties also requested, and the Court ordered, that the time between July 23, 2013 and August 20, 2013, would be excluded from the running of the speedy trial clock for effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The parties agree that, taking into account the public interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases, good cause exists for this extension. The parties also agreed that the ends of justice served by granting such a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
For the reasons stated above, this matter is continued until August 20, 2013, for another status conference at which time change of plea, motions, or trial will be discussed. The Court finds that the exclusion of time from July 23, 2013 through August 20, 2013 is warranted and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A). The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny the defendants effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel and would result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).