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United States v. Levario

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

August 19, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
RAMON LEVARIO, et al. Defendant.

DANNY D. BRACE, JR., #114466 LAW OFFICE OF DANNY D. BRACE, JR., Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant.

Jason Lawley, Sonny Gonzalez, Kelly Babineau, Jesse Montanez, Jill Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

AMENDED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, JILL THOMAS and defendants, RAMON LEVARIO, by his counsel DANNY D. BRACE, JR., SONNY GONZALEZ by his counsel JASON LAWLEY, and JESSE MONTANEZ, by his counsel KELLY BABINEAU, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 20, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 8, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between August 20, 2013 and October 8, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients regarding a resolution to this case.

b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The government does not object to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 20, 2013, to October 8, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


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