August 19, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
DUWAYNE LEDOUX, Defendant.
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874) ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant DUWAYNE LEDOUX.
Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, JASON HITT, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Duwayne Ledoux, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on August 22, 2013. On May 30, 2013, Mr. Ledoux was arraigned on a superseding indictment before the Honorable Allison Claire. The superseding indictment alleges several additional charges (both drug and financial) as well as noticing the defendant's (alleged) priors. In early August 2013, the Court advised the parties the Court would not be available on the next scheduled appearance date (8/22/13) and the matter would have to be re-scheduled.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 3, 2013 and to exclude time between August 22, 2013 and October 3, 2013 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to meet with the defendant in order to review the discovery; review investigation reports, discuss and analyze relevant USSG calculations; and, review the pre-plea criminal history report prepared by USPO.
b. Currently the discovery includes 1, 197 pages of discovery.
c. Counsel for defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of August 22, 2013 and October 3, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.