August 26, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
IRINA GEREZ, Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, R. STEVEN LAPHAM, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on August 27, 2013 at 9:45 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until September 24, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between August 27, 2013 and September 24, 2013 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. The government has recently produced additional discovery to defendant, and defendant is in the process of obtaining additional documents through her own efforts. The parties need additional time to obtain and review these documents. Additionally, counsel for each party met and conferred regarding a potential factual basis on August 13, 2013. Defense counsel needs additional time to schedule the services of an interpreter to discuss the substance of that meeting with his client.
b. Counsel for defendant has been reviewing previously disclosed discovery, discussing it with his client, and assessing potential trial and sentencing issues.
c. Additionally, government counsel and defense counsel have consulted their schedules, and September 24, 2013, is the first mutually agreeable, available date for a status conference.
d. Based on the foregoing, defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with his client, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on September 24, 2013, at 9:45 a.m. and that it find excludable time from August 27, 2013 through and including the September 24, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to September 24, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 16, 2013 to September 24, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.