September 6, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MOCTEZUMA TOVAR, et al., Defendants.
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, MANUEL HERRERA.
THOMAS A. JOHNSON, Attorney for Defendant, Moctezuma Tovar.
JOHN R. MANNING, Attorney for Defendant, Manuel Herrera.
BRUCE LOCKE, Attorney for Defendant, Ruben Rodriguez.
RONALD J. PETERS, Attorney for Defendant, Jaime Maorga.
ERIN J. RADEKIN, Attorney for Defendant, Sandra Hermosillo.
MATTHEW M. SCOBLE, Attorney for Defendant, Jun Dirain.
Benjamin B. Wagneer, United States Attorney, LEE BICKLEY, Assistant U.S. Attorney, CHRISTOPHER COSCA, Attorney for Defendant, Christian Renteria.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Lee Bickley, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Moctezuma Tovar, Thomas A. Johnson, Esq., counsel for defendant Manuel Herrera, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Ruben Rodriguez, Bruce Locke, Esq., counsel for defendant Jaime Mayorga, Ronald J. Peters. Esq., counsel for defendant Sandra Hermosillo, Erin J. Radekin, counsel for defendant Jun Dirain, Matthew M. Scoble, Esq., and counsel for defendant Christian Renteria, Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on September 9, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 15, 2013 and to exclude time between September 9, 2013 and October 15, 2013 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is voluminous mortgage fraud case involving (allegedly) numerous properties and individuals (including seven co-defendants). Thus far, the Government has produced over 25, 000 pages of discovery (plus numerous audio recordings). The conduct alleged in this matter spans several years and, at the time of indictment, was several years old.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery and conduct investigation.
c. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of September 9, 2013 to October 15, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.