September 19, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
DAMIAN MORALES-JERONIMO, Defendant,
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for the United States of America.
BARBARA H. O'NEILL, Counsel for Defendant, DAMIAN MORALES-JERONIMO.
STIPULATION TO SET CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING; FINDINGS AND ORDER
ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference for four defendants, including Damian Morales-Jeronimo, on September 23, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the undersigned parties agree to vacate the status conference as to Damian Morales-Jeronimo only, and set a change of plea hearing for Mr. Morales-Jeronimo for September 23, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. before Senior District Judge Anthony W. Ishii, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and September 23, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have reached a plea agreement in advance of the September 23, 2013 status conference, the plea agreement has been filed with the Court, and the parties' first available date for a change of plea hearing is on September 23, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.
b. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
c. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to September 23, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.