September 19, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LEE LOOMIS, ET AL., Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, PAUL A. HEMESATH, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
CHRISTOPHER HAYDN-MYER, Attorney for DAWN C. POWERS.
MICHAEL B. BIGELOW, Attorney for JOSEPH A. GEKKO.
DOUGLAS J. BEEVERS, Attorney for LEE LOOMIS.
WILLIAM JOHN PORTANOVA, Attorney for JOHN HAGENER.
DAN FRANK KOUKOL, Attorney for PETER WOODARD.
THOMAS A. JOHNSON, Attorney for Michael Llamas.
MICHAEL N. PANCER, Attorney for Michael Llamas.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 24, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 12, 2013, and to exclude time between September 24, 2013, and November 12, 2013, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes hundreds of thousands of pages of discovery and terabytes of electronic discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Attorneys for defendants desire additional time to conduct additional investigation, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their respective clients, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Attorneys for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 24, 2013 to November 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7) (B)(iv) [Local Code T4 - Preparation] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
g) Due to the complexity of this case-in particular the volume and type of discovery-this time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) [Local Code T2 - Complexity].
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.