September 19, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MAURISIO ANDRADE, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, OLUSERE A. OLOWOYEYE, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
DAN KOUKOL, Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 26, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 17, 2013, at 9:30 a.m., for status conference/possible change of plea, and to exclude time between September 26, 2013, and October 17, 2013, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, video and audio surveillance footage and related documents on electronic form. This entire discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 26, 2013 to October 17, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.