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United States v. Broddie

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

September 25, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
JANA CATHERINE BRODDIE, Defendant

ROBERT L. FORKNER (CSB#166097), Law Offices of Robert L. Forkner, Modesto, CA, Attorney for Defendant, JANA CATHERINE BRODDIE.

KATHLEEN ANNE SERVATIUS, Assistant United States Attorney.

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING AND TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Defendant, by and through his counsel, Robert L. Forkner and Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record Assistant United States Attorney KATHLEEN ANNE SERVATIUS, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on September 30, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until November 18, 2013 and to exclude time between September 30, 2012 and November 18, 2013 under Local Code T4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Plaintiff does not object to this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The United States Probation Officer has not submitted a revised Presentencing Report or response to defendant's sentencing memorandum.

b. Counsel for defendant inadvertently failed to give the United States Probation Officer informal objections and the opportunity to respond to the defendant's objections. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to allow the probation officer and plaintiff time to respond to the defendant's sentencing memorandum and time to consult with his client once the responses are filed.

c. The defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government stipulates to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 30, 2013 to November 18, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.


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