October 11, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LAFONZO LUKE BROWN, RASHAD RAKEEM BROWN, RAKEEM MARCELLES BROWN, AND MARCELIS FITZGERALD LEE Defendant.
MICHAEL HINCKLEY, State Bar No. 161645, THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL HINCKLEY, Berkeley, California, Attorneys for Defendant MARCELIS LEE.
NATALIE LEE, Assistant United States Attorney, MICHAEL HINCKLEY, Attorneys for Marcelis Lee, ELIZABETH FALK, Attorney for Lafonzo Brown, RANDY SUE POLLOCK, Attorney for Rashad Brown, ISMAIL RAMSEY, Attorney for Rakeem Brown.
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE HEARING/EXCLUSION OF TIME
RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
Defendants, by and through their appointed counsel, and the United States of America, by and through Assistant United States Attorney Natalie Lee, hereby stipulate and agree to continue the setting or disposition conference in this matter from October 15, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. to November 5, 2013, at 2:30 p.m. The parties agree that excluding the time resulting from this continuance from computation under the Speedy Trial Act is in the interest of justice and outweighs the best interest of both the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, and is necessary for effective preparation of defense counsel.
Good cause exists for this request in that at the last calling of the case the matter was continued to October 15, 2013 for the parties to obtain modified presentence reports reflecting the defendants' criminal history calculations. Some of defendants' counsel just received the reports. Others have not yet received the reports. Additional time is needed to review and evaluate the reports as well as to confer with defendants and all parties regarding the effects the information has, if any, on proposed global dispositions.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, upon stipulation of the parties, the date for setting or disposition is continued from October 16, 2013, to November 5, 2013 at 2:30 p.m.
Also, based upon the representation of counsel and the stipulation, and good cause shown, the Court finds that failure to exclude time from October 16, 2013, through November 5, 2013, would unreasonably deny defendants reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of their respective counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court finds that the ends of justice served by excluding time from October 16, 2013 through November 5, 2013, from computation under the Speedy Trial Act outweigh the best interest of both the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time from October 16, 2013, through November 5, 2013, shall be excluded from computation under the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161 (h)(7)(A) &(B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.