ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM AND REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT
FERNANDO M. OLGUIN, District Judge.
The court has reviewed and considered all the briefing filed with respect to defendants Federal National Mortgage Association, Bank of America, N.A. and ReconTrust Company, N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss Case ("Motion"), and concludes that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the Motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78.
On April 29, 2013, Susan Parra ("plaintiff") filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"), and ReconTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, "defendants"). (See Notice of Removal ("NOR"), Exh. A ("Complaint")). Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of California Civil Code, § 2924, et seq.; (2) violation of California Civil Code, § 2923.5; (3) violation of California Civil Code, § 2924.17; (4) violation of California Business & Professions Code, § 17200; (5) set aside trustee's sale; (6) cancel trustee's deed; (7) quiet title; (8) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (9) declaratory relief. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 18-65).
On June 26, 2013, defendants filed the instant Motion. The Motion to Dismiss was accompanied by defendants' Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff filed her Opposition to the Motion ("Opp.") on July 26, 2013. Defendants filed their Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on July 31, 2013.
This action arises out of a loan transaction made pursuant to the refinancing of the real property located at 12411 Osborne Street, Unit 32, Pacoima, California (the "Property"). (See Complaint at ¶ 7). In October 2006, plaintiff obtained a $155, 000 mortgage loan from Greenlight Financial Services ("Greenlight"). (See id. ¶¶ 9-10). The fixed rate promissory note ("Note") was secured by a first deed of trust ("DOT") on the Property in favor of Greenlight. (See id. at ¶ 10).
Plaintiff claims that the DOT identified Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as the nominee for the lender. (See Complaint at ¶ 11). According to plaintiff, the Note was "securitized and split" from the DOT, and BANA and Fannie Mae "now claim to be the note holder, the lender, and the beneficiary." (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that neither BANA nor Fannie Mae have an interest in the DOT, nor "any estate, right, title, lien or interest in the Property." (Id.).
In January 2012, plaintiff suffered a work-related injury that prevented her from working, and caused her to fall behind on her mortgage payments. (See Complaint at ¶ 14). Approximately six months later, plaintiff contacted BANA and Fannie Mae to "request an alternative to foreclosure." (See id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff alleges that she was provided with a loan modification application package. (See id.). In a letter sent by BANA, dated December 19, 2012, plaintiff was told that her individual situation would be reviewed. (See id. at ¶ 16). However, on December 27, 2012, plaintiff's home was sold at a trustee sale without prior notice to plaintiff. (See id. at ¶ 17).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly) , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 550 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Cook v. Brewer , 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 550 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Cook , 637 F.3d at 1004; Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc. , 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, " Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965; Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish , 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 974 (2005) ("[T]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [complaint] need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964.
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, Erickson , 551 U.S. at 93-94, 127 S.Ct. at 2200; Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 810 (1994), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleading party, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen , 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1849 (1969); Berg v. Popham , 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it discloses some fact or complete defense that will necessarily defeat the claim. Franklin v. Murphy , 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984).
I. PLAINTIFF'S DUE ...