October 22, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LAFONZO LUKE BROWN, RASHAD RAKEEM BROWN, RAKEEM MARCELLES BROWN, AND MARCELIS FITZGERALD LEE, Defendant.
MICHAEL HINCKLEY, State Bar No. 161645, THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL HINCKLEY, Berkeley, California, Attorneys for Defendant, MARCELIS LEE.
NATALIE LEE, Assistant United States Attorney.
MICHAEL HINCKLEY, Assistant Marcelis Lee.
ELIZABETH FALK, Attorney for Lafonzo Brown.
RANDY SUE POLLOCK, Attorney for Rashad Brown.
ISMAIL RAMSEY, Attorney for Rakeem Brown.
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE HEARING/EXCLUSION OF TIME
RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
Defendants, by and through their appointed counsel, and the United States of America, by and through Assistant United States Attorney Natalie Lee, hereby stipulate and agree to continue the setting or disposition conference in this matter from November 8, 2013, at 1:30 p.m. to December 10, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. The parties agree that excluding the time resulting from this continuance from computation under the Speedy Trial Act is in the interest of justice and outweighs the best interest of both the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, and is necessary for effective preparation and continuity of defense counsel.
Good cause exists for this request. Shortly after setting the current November 8th court date, counsel for Rashad Brown had a previously scheduled surgery rescheduled - creating an unexpected conflict with that date. Because the government's proposed case resolutions are contingent upon a global disposition, the request brief continuance is necessary and requested.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, upon stipulation of the parties, the date for setting or disposition is continued from November 8, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. to December 10, 2013 at 2:30 p.m.
Also, based upon the representations of counsel and the stipulation, and good cause shown, the Court finds that failure to exclude time from November 8, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. to December 10, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of their respective counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court finds that the ends of justice served by excluding time from November 8, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. to December 10, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., from computation under the Speedy Trial Act outweigh the best interest of both the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time from November 8, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. to December 10, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., shall be excluded from computation under the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161 (h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.