BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America
ROTHSCHILD WISHEK & SANDS LLP, CLYDE M. BLACKMON, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 25, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 25, 2013, and to exclude time between October 25, 2013 and December 13, 2013, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 960 pages of discovery along with a CD containing photographs. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to otherwise prepare for trial. This includes reviewing additional materials that were recently provided to counsel by the defendant, which counsel believes may be relevant to the potential disposition of this case.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 25, 2013 to December 13, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...