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United States v. Reed

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

October 23, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
DARRON ANTJUAN REED, Defendant.

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, PHILIP A. FERRARI, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.

JASON LAWLEY, Counsel for Defendant.

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 24, 2013. It is noted that the matter consists of two related cases, including a petition alleging a violation of the terms of supervised release in case CR S 07-348 MCE.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 5, 2013, and to exclude time between October 24, 2013, and December 5, 2013, under Local Code T4, in case CR S 13-304 MCE.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case is primarily physical evidence, seized from the defendant's residence, which is available for review by his counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to conduct legal research regarding the pending charges, and to arrange to physically inspect the evidence in this case.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 24, 2013 to December 5, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable in case CR S 13-304 MCE pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.


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