October 29, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
EDILIO NAVARRO NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS Defendants.
DAVID D. FISCHER (SBN 224900) LAW OFFICES OF DAVID D. FISCHER, APC, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS.
David D. Fischer for MICHAEL PETRIK, Attorney for Defendant. EDILIO NAVARRO
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, U.S. ATTORNEY, David D. Fischer for SAMUEL WONG, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 31, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 19, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between October 31, 2013, and December 19, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government initially provided 32 pages of investigative reports. These reports show that there are additional audio and video recordings and other evidence available for inspection and copying. Defense counsel for defendant Venegas is working on providing reciprocal discovery and needs additional time to gather and organize this discovery to provide to the government.
b. Counsel for the defendants desires additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 31, 2013, to December 19, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of all parties, it is ordered that the October 31, 2013, status conference hearing be continued to December 19, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from October 31, 2013, up to and including the December 19, 2013, status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.