October 29, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
EMILIO MONTIEL-DELGADO, aka Emilio Montiel, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney, NIRAV K. DESAI, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ERIN RADEKIN, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 31, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 14, 2013, and to exclude time between October 31, 2013, and November 14, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 95 pages of documents from the defendant's A-file. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) The Pre-Plea Presentence Investigation Report was issued on October 25, 2013, and counsel for defendant desires additional time to request corrections and/or substantive adjustments to the Pre-Plea Presentence Investigation Report in advance of any possible change of plea and request for sentencing. The government has reserved the right to respond to any such requests by the defendant. The Pre-Plea Presentence Investigation Report is central to any possible change of plea because the standard plea agreement in "Fast-Track" immigration cases contemplates that changes of plea and sentencing occur on the same day.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 31, 2013, to November 14, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.