October 29, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
VICTOR MAGANA FIGUEROA; AND ALFREDO URIEL VALENCIA-MENDOZA, Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHAEL D. McCOY, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
J TONEY, Counsel for Defendant VICTOR MAGANA FIGUEROA
KATHRYN KOHLMAN DRULINER, Counsel for Defendant ALFREDO URIEL VALENCIA-MENDOZA
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON E. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 24, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until November 21, 2013, and to exclude time between October 24, 2013, and November 21, 2013, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that it has already provided counsel for defendants with initial discovery in this case; however, additional discovery is pending and is expected to be disclosed within the next seven days
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review discovery in this case with their clients, review the current charges, and conduct investigation and research related to those charges. Counsel for defendants also need additional time to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, or, in the alternative, to consider and prepare pretrial motions.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 24, 2013 to November 21, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.