ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
WILLIAM H. ORRICK, District Judge.
Currently before the Court are defendant's motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement. The motions are set for hearing on November 6, 2013. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds these matters appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers submitted, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES defendant's motions.
Plaintiff Largan Precision Co, Ltd. filed this patent infringement action on June 4, 2013, alleging that defendant Genius Electronic Optical Co., Ltd. is infringing five Largan patents that cover imaging lens systems. Largan alleges that "many imaging lenses from Genius, including lenses incorporated into products of Apple such as the iPhone 5 and iPad mini incorporate the inventions of one or more Largan patents." Complaint ¶ 8. As to direct infringement, Largan alleges that Genius infringes its patents through "the making, using, sale, offer for sell, or importation of its products, including without limitation an imaging lens used" in Apple's iPhone 5 and iPad mini. Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 24, 31, 38, and 45.
As to indirect, induced infringement, Largan alleges that Genius has "induced infringement by inducing others, including without limitation Apple, cellular service providers, distributors, and end users, to make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import the accused devices in the United States and this District." See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 18. Largan also alleges that, "[o]n information and belief, Genius also has provided marketing materials, technical specifications, or other materials that instruct and encourage the purchaser of an accused device to use the device in a manner that infringes certain claims" of its patents. See, e.g., id.
As to indirect, contributory infringement, Largan alleges that Genius "has contributed to the infringement of others, including without limitation Apple, cellular service provides, distributors, and end users, by offering to sell, selling, or importing within this District and the United States an imaging lens component constituting a material part of a patented optical system, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in the infringement" of its patents, "and not a staple article of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use." See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 19.
Genius moves for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) as to Largan's direct infringement claims, arguing that Largan has failed to specify which, if any, of Genius's alleged activities take place in the United States. Genius also moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) plaintiff's indirect infringement claims, arguing that the Complaint fails to allege adequate facts showing Genius had knowledge of infringement and specific intent to induce others to infringe. Largan opposes the motions, contending the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support its direct and indirect infringement allegations.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), "[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Rule 12(e) motions should be granted only on those "rare occasions" when a complaint is so vague or so ambiguous that a party has insufficient information to prepare its response. See, e.g., Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 843 fn 1. (9th Cir. 2000).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). There must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. While courts do not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, " a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
If the court dismisses the complaint, it "should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making this determination, the court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.1989).
I. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT ON ...