November 8, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MARTINEZ-CHAIREZ, et al., Defendants.
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, ANGEL MARTINEZ-DIAZ.
CHRISTOPHER R. COSCA, Attorney for Defendant,
Jose Maria Villareal, Attorney for Defendant,
VICTOR D. VERTNER, Attorney for Defendant, Jose Ramirez-Verduzco.
Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney,
RICHARD J. BENDER, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Richard J. Bender, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jose Maria Villareal, Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., counsel for defendant Angel Martinez-Diaz, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Jose Ramirez-Verduzco, Victor D. Vertner, Esq., hereby stipulate the following (defendant Jose Martinez-Chairez will remain on the November 12, 2013 calendar for change of plea):
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on November 12, 2013. Additionally, by previous order, the following motion schedule was agreed upon: defense motions due 11/26/13; oppositions due 12/10/13; replies due 12/17; and, a hearing on the motions is scheduled for 1/7/14. This previously agreed upon schedule is in no way impacted by this stipulation.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference (and anticipated change of plea by one or more or the remaining defendants) until December 10, 2013 and to exclude time between November 12, 2013 and December 10, 2013 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This case currently contains over a 100 pages of discovery as well as two DVD's with videos and one CD of audio recordings (the recordings are in Spanish).
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of November 12, 2013 to December 10, 2013 is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.