November 12, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
VITALIY MULYAR, Defendant.
HEATHER E. WILLIAMS, #122664, Federal Defender, BENJAMIN D. GALLOWAY, #214897, Assistant Federal Defender, Designated Counsel for Service Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant VITALIY MULYAR.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff.
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on November 14, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until January 9, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between November 14, 2013 and January 9, 2014 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes forensic computer evidence. Counsel for the defendant, Assistant Federal Defender Benjamin Galloway, was recently assigned to this case due to the retirement of prior counsel, Assistant Federal Defender Jeffrey Staniels.
b. Based on the recent reassignment, defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the discovery, the case file, and to consult with the defendant to assess potential trial and sentencing issues, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on January 9, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from November 14, 2013 through and including the January 9, 2014 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to January 9, 2014 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 14, 2013 to January 9, 2014 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.