November 12, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
ALEJANDRO MUNOZ GALVAN, et al., Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff. United States of America.
ERIN RADEKIN, ESQ., SHARI RUSK, ESQ., MICHAEL BIGELOW, ESQ., For the Defendant Alejandro Pantoja-Solorio.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER STIPULATION
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Alejandro Munoz Galvan, Gerardo Cardensa, and Alejandro Pantoja-Solorio, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 14, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 16, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 14, 2013 and January 16, 2014, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and other related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult to review discovery for this matter, to engage in discussions with the United States regarding potential resolution, for which they will need to review discovery provided, and to otherwise prepare for a possible trial.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The United States does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 14, 2013 to January 16, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.