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Medina v. People

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

November 19, 2013

JAVIER MEDINA, Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, [1] Respondent.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

DAVID T. BRISTOW, Magistrate Judge.

On October 22, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Pet.") herein. The Petition purports to be directed to a 2008 conviction sustained by petitioner in Orange County Superior Court (see Pet. at ¶¶ 1-2), and includes a single ground for relief. (See Pet. at ¶ 7(a).)

Based on its review of the Petition, as well as information derived from the California Appellate Courts website[2], it appears to the Court that the Petition is time-barred. Accordingly, on or before December 19, 2013, petitioner is ORDERED to show cause in writing (if any he has) why the Court should not recommend that this action be dismissed with prejudice on the ground of untimeliness.[3]

THE TIME BAR ISSUE

Since this action was filed after the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA") on April 24, 1996, it is subject to the AEDPA's one-year limitation period, as set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Beeler) , 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997).[4] 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

"(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."

From a review of the Petition, as well as the California Appellate Courts website, it appears that petitioner appealed the underlying judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which subsequently affirmed the underlying judgment of conviction on November 25, 2009. It appears to the Court that petitioner failed to petition the California Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeal decision on direct appeal, even although he alleges that he did so. (California Appellate Court's website; Pet. at ¶ 4.) Under the relevant California Rules of Court, his time for filing a Petition for Review lapsed 40 days after the November 25, 2009 filing of the Court of Appeal decision. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.264(b)(1) [formerly 24(b)(1)] and 8.500(e)(1) [formerly 28(e)(1)]. Thus, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), petitioner's judgment of conviction "became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review" on January 4, 2010.

From the face of the Petition, it does not appear that petitioner has any basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(d)(1)(B). The Court notes in this regard that petitioner did not have a constitutional right to counsel for purposes of filing a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court or a state habeas petition. See Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (holding that the right to counsel extends "to the first appeal of right, and no further"). Nor does it appear that petitioner has any basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(d)(1)(C) because none of the claims alleged in the Petition appears to be based on a federal constitutional right that was initially recognized by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to the date his conviction became final and that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Finally, it does not appear that petitioner has any basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(d)(1)(D) since it appears that petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of each of his claims as of the date he was convicted and sentenced. See Hasan v. Galaza , 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (statute of limitations begins to run when a prisoner "knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance").

Thus, unless a basis for tolling the statute existed, petitioner's last day to file his federal habeas petition was January 4, 2011. See Patterson v. Stewart , 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The instant Petition was filed on October 22, 2013, more than ...


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