December 11, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LUIS MIGUEL GARCIA-CHAVEZ, and BERNARDO GONZALEZ, Defendants.
TONI H. CARBONE (SBN 210119), ATTORNEY AT LAW, Auburn, CA, Attorney for Defendant, BERNARDO GONZALEZ.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, Toni Carbone for JASON HITT, Assistant U.S. Attorney, For the United States.
Toni Carbone, BENJAMIN GALLOWAY, for Defendant LUIS MIGUEL GARCIA-CHAVEZ.
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Defendant, BERNARDO GONZALEZ, by and through his counsel of record, TONI CARBONE, LUIS MIGUEL GARCIA-CHAVEZ, by and through his counsel BENJAMIN GALLOWAY, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 12, 2013.
LUIS MIGEL GARCIA-CHAVEZ, through his counsel, BENJAMIN GALLOWAY, and BERNARDO GONZALEZ, through his counsel, TONI CARBONE, and the GOVERNMENT are working to resolve the case. The matter needs additional time to resolve and, as such, the defendants through their counsel request that the status conference be continued. The GOVERNMENT has no objection.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 23, 2014, and to exclude time between December 12, 2013 and January 23, 2014 under Local Code T4. The GOVERNMENT does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The matters are closer to resolution. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The GOVERNMENT does not object to the continuance.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 12, 2013 to January 23, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.