December 11, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MICHAEL McCREE, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
JEFFREY FLETCHER, For the Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT STIPULATION
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 12, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until February 20, 2014 and to exclude time between December 12, 2013 and February 20, 2014, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, workers' compensation benefits records, bank records, and other related documents in electronic form constituting approximately 2600 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel. Additionally, defense counsel has produced information to the United States as to the issue of resolution.
b. Defense counsel has requested the United States make a formal plea offer, which the United States has presented to the defense.
c. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and to review discovery for this matter, to engage in discussions with the United States regarding potential resolution, for which he will need to review discovery provided and the information provided to the United States, and to otherwise prepare for a possible trial. Further, counsel for the defense is presently in a multi-defendant murder trial in state court and has another trial set for January 2014.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 12, 2013 to February 20, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.