December 17, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
WALDO PEREZ MENDOZA, Defendant.
Dina L. Santos, SBN 204200, A Professional Law Corp., Sacramento, CA, Attorney for: WALDO PEREZ MENDOZA.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 1/21/14
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Waldo Perez Mendoza, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 17, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 21, 2014, and to exclude the time period from between the date of this stipulation, December 13, 2013, to, and including, January 21, 2014, from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court shall find and order the following:
a) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, continue to review the discovery, conduct investigation, explore a possible legal conflict that defense counsel may have in representing defendant, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period beginning from the date of this stipulation, December 13, 2013, to, and including, January 21, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.