BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JUSTIN L. LEE, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA.
DINA SANTOS, Attorney for Defendant.
STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. This matter is presently set for a Status Conference on December 16, 2013.
2. By this Stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference until February 27, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between December 19, 2013, and February 27, 2014, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have discussed potential resolution of this case, however, the parties have not been able to finalize terms of a plea agreement. Specifically, both parties are continuing to investigate mitigating factors with respect to the defendant's offensive conduct and how these factors impact sentencing. Additionally, defense counsel needs additional time to fairly advise the defendant of the potential consequences of a plea.
b. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The United States does not object to this continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, within which trial must commence, the time period of December 19, 2013, to February 27, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...