ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
DAVID T. BRISTOW, Magistrate Judge.
On December 3, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Pet.") herein along with supporting attachments ("Pet. Att."). The Petition purports to be directed to a judgment of conviction sustained by petitioner in Los Angeles County Superior Court on December 28, 1998, following petitioner's no contest plea to the allegations of robbery and burglary. Petitioner was sentenced on the same day as his plea to a prison term 13 years. (See Pet. at ¶ 2(f).) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. (See Pet. at ¶ 3.) The Petition raises a single claim of actual innocence. (See Pet. at ¶ 7(a).)
The Court's review of the Petition reveals that it appears to be untimely. Accordingly, on or before January 17, 2014, petitioner is ORDERED to show cause in writing (if any he has) why the Court should not recommend that this action be dismissed with prejudice on the ground of untimeliness.
Since this action was filed after the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA") on April 24, 1996, it is subject to the AEDPA's one-year limitation period, as set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Beeler) , 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:
"(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence."
Under California law in effect at the time of petitioner's conviction, an appeal had to be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment. See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.308(a) [formerly Rule 30.1(a)]. Where the judgment of conviction was entered upon a guilty or nolo contendere plea, the defendant was required to file a notice of intended appeal within the 60-day period, accompanied by a statement "showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings"; the appeal did not become operative unless and until the trial court executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for appeal. See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.304(b) [formerly Rule 30(b)]; see also Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5. Here, petitioner has indicated that he did not appeal from his judgment of conviction. (See Pet. at ¶ 3.) Consequently, "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review" here was February 26, 1999, when petitioner's time to file a notice of intended appeal expired. Petitioner had one year from that date within which to file his federal habeas petition.
From the face of the Petition, it does not appear that petitioner has a basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(b)(1)(B). Petitioner is not contending that he was impeded from filing his federal petition by unconstitutional state action. Nor does it appear that petitioner has a basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(b)(1)(C). Moreover, it is clear that petitioner has no basis for contending that he is entitled to a later trigger date under § 2244(b)(1)(D). Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims as of the date he pleaded guilty. See Hasan v. Galaza , 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (statute of limitations begins to run when a prisoner "knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance").
Thus, unless a basis for tolling the statute existed, petitioner's last day to file his federal habeas petition was February 26, 2000. See Patterson v. Stewart , 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001); Beeler , 128 F.3d at 1287-88. The instant Petition was filed over 13 years later.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted ...